Ukraine Urban Recovery: Recovery When the Threat Lingers

War in Ukraine and Recovery

Brutal Catalyst: What Ukraine’s Cities Tell Us About Recovery From War, available at: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0DJ8Q7BGJ

A continuation of discussions drawing on Brutal Catalyst: What Ukraine’s Cities Tell Us About Recovery From War, released October 8, 2024.

Photograph by author.

Every recovery from war is unique, just as is every war spawning the need. That probably qualifies as the most obvious statement across these thirteen posts. The less fortunate, Ukraine among them, must prepare for another war even as they recover from that just ended. “Ended,” in fact, will likely prove optimistic in the case of Ukraine. Russia’s 2022 invasion was the reheating of an ongoing conflict simmering and occasionally boiling over after the worst of fighting ceased post-the 2014 invasions of Crimea and Donbas. Post-WWII Western Europe suffered a similar though less immediate threat, that from a bellicose Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners. Those of us fortunate enough to have served in Germany during its difficult Cold War years are more or less familiar with bridges and highways “pre-chambered” with compartments purpose-built for emplacement of explosives and rapid destruction should the enemy attack. Those of us who also (or instead) served in South Korea during those years might remember massive barriers ready to close roadways given the hoped-for-never renewal of the North’s 1950 violation of Republic of Korea sovereignty.

Given Russia’s propensity for dreadful leadership and misjudgment, Ukraine cannot rest easy even should the ongoing war end in a peace treaty promising complete cessation of armed conflict. Ukrainians know this. Many of the steps they are taking as combat continues address recovery from this war with an eye to possible renewals of Russia’s aggression. They do not see underground facilities—schools, medical facilities, and more—as temporary expedients. Dispersal of key infrastructure both within and beyond the country’s borders is akin to placing backup generators beyond the reach of flood waters. Hopes that Ukrainian preparations for the cloudy peace to come will prove effective have underpinnings in the country’s impressive handling of cyberattacks preceding and following the February 2022 invasion.

Ukraine’s recovery offers lessons for other countries that might confront future wars. The expanse of land, urban and rural alike, contaminated with mines and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) includes munitions both familiar and not seen before. Collectively, they cover so vast an area (or, more appropriately volume in the case of urban areas) and in such numbers that the men and women responsible for UXO disposal find themselves severely tasked merely to compile much less act on their knowledge of what it is, where it is, and how much there is. Early missteps regarding collaboration policy as touched on in earlier posts offer additional insights. Covered extensively in Brutal Catalyst but left undiscussed in this series of posts, black marketing is another war-related conundrum as of yet unsolved. Among the riddles: When post-war availability of critical resources is inadequate to meet recovery needs, to what extent should a government tolerate black marketeering and its related criminality, price gouging, and empowerment of those making fortunes from illicit trade? Ukraine is likely to experience black marketing to some extent in hard-to-find construction materials if nothing else. What will constitute an effective counter-policy? Will one be desirable, or will there be at least temporary value in a “live and let live” approach until officials and markets address shortages…despite the risks in such an approach? The answer is no less murky than the origins of some products available in those markets.

The international response as Ukraine undertakes recovery activities is encouraging (even if inconsistent, as in the case of the United States, Germany, and some other countries). The billions of dollars in aid promised and provided provide great temptations to the unsavory, however. This is particularly true given Ukraine’s unfortunate less-than-stellar record in terms of corruption. Management of these billions in such an environment poses tough challenges for Kyiv. Centralized oversight of aid receipt and distribution is desirable, oversight logically provided by one or more international teams incorporating Ukrainians, donor representatives, experienced fraud investigators, and police among others. Punishments for those robbing Ukraine require teeth. Simply removing oligarchs or other offenders from their positions when they are afoul of the law is inadequate. Already rich and connected in many cases, such individuals’ fallback is inevitably a comfortable one. The only inconvenience suffered is loss of yet another income stream. Again, history provides plentiful examples that are none too encouraging, US experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan among them. Donor country anti-corruption policies are frequently little more than Western practices applied with deficient attention paid to local practices and norms. Alternatives to the Western-size-fits-all merit investigation.

The above small sample of considerations inherent in recovery can but hint at its complexity. Not to be overlooked in Ukraine’s case: the lurking specter of ethnic differences with the potential to cause rifts capable of undermining national cohesion. Ill-advised collaboration policies and contracts perceived as favoring one social group over another risk dividing when uniting should be the priority. Recovery from any disaster is difficult. Populations justifiably view its handling as reflective of their government’s effectiveness. History can inform. Though its lessons are at times less helpful than might be desired, taking what they offer provides seeds for creative thinking and innovative adaptation.

And that, colleagues and friends, is a wrap for this series of posts…at least for now. I trust they have been of some value and, perhaps, occasionally entertaining as well.

Best to all. Here, too, is the wrap on our trivia accompaniment:

Previous trivia question: How many of the Baseball Hall of Fame’s members were World War II veterans?

Answer: There are 346 members of the hall as of mid-2024. Thirty-nine were World War II veterans. (See https://historyfacts.com/famous-figures/fact/thirty-nine-baseball-hall-of-famers-served-in-world-war-ii/)


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Russell W. Glenn, Brutal Catalyst: What Ukraine’s Cities Tell Us About Recovery From War (Boulder, CO: KeyPoint Press, 2024). Available in hardback, paperback, and eBook at https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0DJ8Q7BGJ.

For media inquiries and review copies, email: editor@keypointpress.com

Discover more about the war in Ukraine and recovery at: www.ukrainecities.com

KeyPointPress: www.keypointpress.com

Dr. Russ Glenn

Dr. Russell W. Glenn served over twenty-five years with the US Army. He spent sixteen years in the think tank community before joining the faculty of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian National University in Canberra. He and his wife, Dee, now live in Williamsburg, Virginia.

http://ukrainecities.com
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Ukraine Urban Recovery: Of Mines and Metrics, 3 of 3