Ukraine Urban Recovery (part 8): Ukrainian Leaders’ Collaboration Conundrum
A continuation of discussions drawing on Brutal Catalyst: What Ukrainian Cities Tell Us about Recovery from War to be released by KeyPoint Press in autumn 2024; sign up for release notification at www.ukrainecities.com
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City of Toretsk in the Donetsk region, July 2024
(Photo by Kostiantyn and Vlada Liberov, available at https://war.ukraine.ua/photos/?photo=55760. Used with kind permission of the official website of Ukraine)
Ukraine had convicted 142 persons of collaboration with the enemy by spring 2023, some fifteen months after Russia’s February 2022 renewal of its 2014 invasion. Punishments ranged from life imprisonment to fines. Mayors, city bureaucrats, engineers, infrastructure maintainers, law enforcement personnel, teachers, doctors, nurses, and firefighters are among those who had faced the choice of continuing to serve or refusing and putting community members at risk. The line between legitimate service to city residents and overzealous support of the occupiers in occupied cities was—and continues to be—a dusky space in which shades of white, gray, and black overlap and delineations are blurred. Blog 6 in this series (the first of these three posts regarding collaboration) told of Izyum, the small city outside Kharkiv the social fabric of which was torn and badly in need of mending thanks largely to accusations of collaboration. Blog 7 called for centralized guidance in terms of better defining collaboration and appropriate penalties. Easily called for. Less easily achieved. Should collaboration be defined identically regardless of an occupation’s duration and scope? Should regional conditions be granted consideration just as should the circumstances of individuals when specifying and outlining punishments? Knowing some in Belgium’s Flemish community bristled at domination by the French-speaking majority, German occupiers in 1940 freed native Flemish-speaking prisoners of war taken in the opening months of WWII. Walloons, who spoke French, remained imprisoned for the conflict’s duration, an obvious attempt to recruit collaborative support from a minority population segment. [Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (NY: Penguin, 1945), 33] Russian occupiers similarly seek to infect Ukrainian cities.
Kyiv’s collaboration policies should prioritize mending rather than punishment, this while not excusing extremes of cooperation with the enemy. Given the government’s definition of collaboration as provided in blog post 6, farmers who registered their farms as directed by Russian occupiers could be prosecuted, this though registration was mandatory if they were to continue operations. Kherson’s former mayor, Ihor Kolykhayev, remained in office when the Russians seized the city in 2022, resisting occupier impositions. Despite his later forced removal and abduction by the Russians, some consider his motivations suspect. (The International Committee of the Red Cross confirmed his status as a Russian prisoner on September 13, 2023.)
France was one of the countries facing the collaboration conundrum post its WWII German occupation. With many hot to find and punish scapegoats, the government faced the embarrassing situation of lacking the laws to try other than the most heinous of collaborators, those who could be accused of treason. Bringing no pride to the country’s legal system, the solution was to create a retroactive crime, that of “national indignity.” Further, jurors in collaboration trials had to be individuals who had “never ceased to demonstrate their patriotic sentiments,” resulting in many being former resistance members likely to be of dubious objectivity. Trials were frequently conducted in an atmosphere of virulent anti-collaboration that compromised the exercise of justice. It should therefore little surprise that an estimated 10,000 were executed as collaborators, the majority not after a trial conviction but rather due to extrajudicial action. Originally passionately anti-collaborationist, Raymond Aron—who later became one of the country’s leading intellectuals—softened his views, asking, whether it was possible “that the armistice [with the Germans] and Vichy [government under occupation had] attenuated the rigors of the occupation [by] interposing the French administrative apparatus between the Gestapo and the French population.” [Julian Jackson, France on Trial: The Case of Marshal Petain (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2023), xxx] As seems the historical norm, France’s passions to punish collaborators waned over time with the government granting general amnesty in 1953.
For reasons noted in blog post 6, that some Ukrainian officials retained, re-assumed, or accepted government positions under the Russians should not surprise. Nor should it that some did so with reasonable intentions. Experienced local leaders and staff are invaluable to an occupier as the US found after World War II in Japan, Germany, and (largely by exception) again in Iraq over half a century later. Individuals gained their positions thanks to commitment, experience, talent, political connections, persevering in elections, or—very likely—some combination of the five. That there are those in Ukraine who chose to cooperate with the enemy regime suggested inherent moral depravity to some, to include officials of senior status in Kyiv who should know the situation in such circumstances is hardly straightforward. Nor are some who become complainants once an occupier departs without malicious intent, suggesting collaboration policies should consider punishments for those who falsely or malevolently accuse. The Russian occupiers’ actions complicate matters yet further. Ukraine’s leaders will have to address disruptions created by the forced introduction of rubles; imposition of occupier passports; educational, psychological, and social influences of Russian propaganda; and other residuals associated with occupier policies. The longer the occupation, the more difficult is finding the line between collaboration and common sense or reasonable excuse. Is the once youth, now adult, schooled for years under an occupier worthy of exemption from prosecution after undergoing lengthy exposure to the enemy’s propaganda? The question will be one of many tasking Kyiv’s leaders if Mariupol should return to their fold after years of occupation.
Our earlier-discussed challenges regarding collaboration outside Kharkiv spotlight the difficulty of distinguishing what we might call malicious collaborators versus maintenance collaborators, helpful but far from distinct categories. Oversimplifying, the first denotes persons supporting occupier agendas that actively seek to undermine the absent legitimate authority. In contrast, maintenance collaborators provide services essential to their community regardless of who is in charge. The latter’s political biases might favor one side or the other or be agnostic in terms of who is in control. Many, likely most, teachers who continue to teach, medical personnel who continue to treat, and city government authorities who continue to perform their duties are among those in this latter category. What they do relieves the occupier of otherwise having to commit manpower to accomplish the same tasks. Alternatively, earlier posts noted that the occupier might instead leave those tasks unmet or under-resourced. The consequences of not cooperating are readily imagined: children untaught, patients untreated, services unprovided.
Kupiansk was a Kharkiv Oblast town of some 27,000 in 2022. Its case is revealing. One observer claimed the Russians threatened the mayor with an ultimatum of “either you surrender the city or we destroy the city and kill everybody.” There was no Ukrainian military force in the vicinity at the time. The mayor surrendered and informed residents it was permissible to accept Russian aid. The same observer blamed Western Ukrainian nationalists for imposing unrealistic standards regarding collaboration once Kyiv reassumed control. One such demand directed that only Ukrainian be spoken in stores. “People continued to speak Russian,” the same individual observed, not because they were pro-Russia, but because that was their language of upbringing and family life. (Anonymous interview with author)
An August 2023 article in The Kyiv Independent presents an alternative view, one further reflecting the muddled environment of collaboration accusations, counter-accusations, rumor, innuendo, and difficulty of determining ground truth…if “truth” exists under such circumstances. The article cites interviews “with dozens of soldiers, police officers, and civilians around Kupiansk” who claimed “many of the local residents that remain are pro-Russian” though estimates of the actual number varied widely. The mayor at the time of the occupiers’ arrival reportedly “welcomed the Russians into his town, joining their occupation authority and aiding them with housing, transportation, and other needs, until Kupiansk was liberated in September 2022.” [Igor Kossov, “Pro-Russian sympathies make life harder for soldiers, cops in Kupiansk district,” The Kyiv Independent, August 15, 2023, https://kyivindependent.com/pro-russian-sympathies-make-life-harder-for-soldiers-cops-in-kupiansk-district/.] The article went on to imply distrust runs deep in the aftermath of Russia’s departure. Divides include those between Ukrainian soldiers and local police, the former accusing the latter of interfering with military efforts to identify local casualties. Senior Kupiansk police investigator Andrii Subotin refuted the accusation. Whatever the elusive truth, difficulty in parsing rumor, wanton accusation, and fact sheds further light on the complexity of equitably dealing with collaboration.
The combined number of collaboration-related cases opened by the National Police of Ukraine and the State Bureau of Investigations totaled 4,593 as of early June 2023. Convictions soon numbered the 142 cited at the opening of this post. Charges ranged from high treason to “aiding and abetting the aggressor state.” Conviction’s consequences in addition to lengthy prison sentences and fines include bans on holding public office and confiscation of property. Ukrainians who fled as Russians withdrew have been charged in absentia. Most departed with the occupiers. Some are thought to have gone elsewhere in Europe. Ukraine compiled an international extradition list to share with Interpol.
Trivia time!
Last trivia question: Why do three of the gravestones at the Normandy American Cemetery have gold-embossed lettering while no others do?
Answer: The three mark the graves of the three Medal of Honor winners buried there. These are:
Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.: Plot D, Row 28, Grave 45. (Quentin Roosevelt, TR Jr.’s brother, not a MH winner, is in grave 46.)
1st Lieutenant Jimmie W. Monteith: Plot I, Row 20, Grave 12
Technical Sergeant Frank D. Peregory: Plot G, Row 21, Grave 7
These are by no means the only MoH earned during the Normandy campaign. Other awardees’ remains were repatriated for burial in other locations at the request of family members.
Here are the Medal of Honor citations for the three soldiers above:
Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt: For gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty on 6 June 1944, in France. After 2 verbal requests to accompany the leading assault elements in the Normandy invasion had been denied, Brig. Gen. Roosevelt's written request for this mission was approved and he landed with the first wave of the forces assaulting the enemy-held beaches. He repeatedly led groups from the beach, over the seawall and established them inland. His valor, courage, and presence in the very front of the attack and his complete unconcern at being under heavy fire inspired the troops to heights of enthusiasm and self-sacrifice. Although the enemy had the beach under constant direct fire, Brig. Gen. Roosevelt moved from one locality to another, rallying men around him, directed and personally led them against the enemy. Under his seasoned, precise, calm, and unfaltering leadership, assault troops reduced beach strong points and rapidly moved inland with minimum casualties. He thus contributed substantially to the successful establishment of the beachhead in France.
(BTW, Henry Fonda portrays Teddy Roosevelt, Jr. in the movie The Longest Day.)
1st Lieutenant Jimmie W. Monteith: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty on 6 June 1944, near Colleville-sur-Mer, France. 1st Lt. Monteith landed with the initial assault waves on the coast of France under heavy enemy fire. Without regard to his own personal safety, he continually moved up and down the beach reorganizing men for further assault. He then led the assault over a narrow protective ledge and across the flat, exposed terrain to the comparative safety of a cliff. Retracing his steps across the field to the beach, he moved over to where 2 tanks were buttoned up and blind under violent enemy artillery and machinegun fire. Completely exposed to the intense fire, 1st Lt. Monteith led the tanks on foot through a minefield and into firing positions. Under his direction, several enemy positions were destroyed. He then rejoined his company and under his leadership, his men captured an advantageous position on the hill. Supervising the defense of his newly won position against repeated vicious counterattacks, he continued to ignore his own personal safety, repeatedly crossing the 200 or 300 yards of open terrain under heavy fire to strengthen links in his defensive chain. When the enemy succeeded in completely surrounding 1st Lt. Monteith and his unit and while leading the fight out of the situation, 1st Lt. Monteith was killed by enemy fire. The courage, gallantry, and intrepid leadership displayed by 1st Lt. Monteith is worthy of emulation.
Technical Sergeant Frank D. Peregory: The President of the United States of America, in the name of Congress, takes pride in presenting the Medal of Honor (Posthumously) to Technical Sergeant Frank D. Peregory (ASN: 20365455), United States Army, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action above and beyond the call of duty while serving with Company K, 3d Battalion, 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division. On 8 June 1944, the 3d Battalion of the 116th Infantry was advancing on the strongly held German defenses at Grandcampe, France, when the leading elements were suddenly halted by decimating machinegun fire from a firmly entrenched enemy force on the high ground overlooking the town. After numerous attempts to neutralize the enemy position by supporting artillery and tank fire had proved ineffective, Technical Sergeant Peregory, on his own initiative, advanced up the hill under withering fire, and worked his way to the crest where he discovered an entrenchment leading to the main enemy fortifications 200 yards away. Without hesitating, he leaped into the trench and moved toward the emplacement. Encountering a squad of enemy riflemen, he fearlessly attacked them with hand grenades and bayonet, killed eight and forced three to surrender. Continuing along the trench, he single-handedly forced the surrender of 32 more riflemen, captured the machine gunners, and opened the way for the leading elements of the battalion to advance and secure its objective. The extraordinary gallantry and aggressiveness displayed by Technical Sergeant Peregory are exemplary of the highest tradition of the armed forces.
Next question: In keeping with questions related to lettering on Normandy American Cemetery grave markers, why do some have sand rubbed into their lettering?
